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CHAPTER 1. INTRODUCTION 
 
 Since the founding of the state of Israel in May of 1948, this unique 
democracy in the Middle East has attracted the constant attention of 
governments, politicians, scholars, and ordinary citizens. The many challenges 
faced by the state, as well as the uniqueness of Israel’s circumstances, have 
been studied extensively. The evolution of its democratic institutions has been no 
exception, and appropriate focus has been placed on social movements, 
organizations, and protest groups. Two of the most well-known of these social 
movements, Gush Emunim (Bloc of the Faithful, established in 1968) and Peace 
Now (established in 1978) have existed on opposite ends of the ideological 
spectrum and have in fact been political rivals. These two groups have a 
common overall goal: the survival and security of the state of Israel. The 
messages and strategies of each group, however, are polar opposites: Gush 
Emunim’s mission is to acquire more land and expand the borders of Israel; 
Peace Now’s objective is to withdraw from occupied Palestinian territory. 
 The ultimate objectives of each of these groups were identical; however, 
while Gush Emunim has achieved concrete goals since its inception in 1968 in 
the form of settlements in Palestinian territory, most of which remain to this day, 
its rival group, Peace Now, has been widely regarded as a failure. Gush Emunim 
sought to expand the territory of the State of Israel to encompass the entire 
Biblical Holy Land. While that has not happened, the heavy settlement of Jews in 
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disputed territories that were captured from Israeli’s Arab neighbors in the 1967 
Six Day War is an enormous victory for Gush Emunim. Not only were they able 
to mobilize enough resources to establish and develop these settlements, they 
were assisted in various ways by the Israeli government. In contrast, Peace Now 
has tried, unsuccessfully, to pressure the government of Israel to return these 
disputed territories to the countries from which they were captured in 1967. 
Peace Now has been active in organizing demonstrations and rallies but has not 
come any closer to realizing its goal than when it was first established in 1978. 
 The aim of this paper is to compare these two groups from several 
theoretical perspectives that center on Mancur Olson’s logic of collective action. 
Specifically, this paper will investigate the reasons for the disparity between 
Gush Emunim and Peace Now in terms of relative success. Why was Gush 
Emunim able to make so much progress toward achieving its goals while Peace 
Now achieved nothing?  
 This paper will be organized as follows. The first part of this paper will 
introduce three theoretical perspectives, beginning with Mancur Olson’s theory of 
collective action, which is the most pertinent theory to this study. Following Olson 
will be a discussion of the importance of collective identities and interpersonal 
interactions to the success of a social movement, which is part of a theory of 
group processes by Debra Friedman and Doug McAdam. The theoretical 
overview will be concluded by a consideration of Bert Klandermans’ emphasis on 
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the effect of ‘success expectations’ on the likelihood of the emergence of 
collective action. 
 Following the introduction of the theories I will provide details regarding 
the history and characteristics of Peace Now and Gush Emunim as well as 
information about the political culture and democratic institutions in Israel. This 
section will draw on the work of David Newman, Tamar Hermann, Uri Ben-
Eliezer, and Eliezer Don-Yehiya, all of whom are respected scholars in their 
fields. Here I will discuss characteristics of the movements such as the 
trajectories of each, the context in which they evolved, the nature of the 
leadership of each group, the strategies employed by them, and their 
connections with the government of Israel.  
 Each of the theoretical perspectives will be applied to my cases. By doing 
this, I show that the failure of Peace Now relative to Gush Emunim can be 
explained in terms of the following: a) Peace Now suffers more acutely than 
Gush Emunim from the problems of collective action; b) for a social movement to 
be successful it must arise out of a previously existing network which ties people 
together in a collective identity; Gush Emunim did arise out of such a network 
whereas Peace Now did not; c) the expectation of success is an important factor 
in whether or not social movements succeed; Gush Emunim followers saw goals 
being accomplished daily while Peace Now followers did not; d) the unique 
political culture of Israel has played a major role in the relative success of Gush 
Emunim as compared to Peace Now. 
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CHAPTER 2. THE THEORIES 
 
 In The Rise and Decline of Nations, Mancur Olson discusses the logic of 
collective action. According to Olson, this logic is such that a group made up of 
rational actors will not achieve its goal—a public good—because each individual 
will choose to do what is best for himself rather than to act in the best interest of 
the group as a whole. Therefore, there can be no public good, and each 
individual will be worse off than he would be if the collective good had been 
achieved.  
  The reasoning behind this can be understood through the example of 
labor unions. A union of workers enjoys a benefit if the resources can be 
gathered: each worker is protected from exploitation by being a union member. 
However, no individual will want to pay his dues because he assumes that his 
neighbors will do it and that he can therefore enjoy the benefit without the cost. If 
every individual uses this reasoning, argues Olson, there will be no resources 
and no union. Selective incentives, which can be positive or negative, can solve 
this problem. Labor unions in particular are often associated with negative 
incentives; Olson discusses some of the tactics historically used by tough-looking 
union members to frighten workers into paying their dues, thus creating a 
resource pool that is sufficient because it has been contributed to by everyone. 
He also uses the example of taxes to illustrate the effectiveness of negative 
incentives: those who do not pay their taxes are punished accordingly, after 
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which they still must pay their taxes (21). Positive selective incentives are goods 
that are available only to participants; their purpose is to motivate individuals to 
contribute to the collective good of the group by offering smaller ‘rewards’ to 
members. Groups that utilize positive incentives include organizations such as 
the American Association of Retired People (AARP), which collects dues from 
members in exchange for ‘specialized’ health and automobile insurance.  
 Mancur Olson believed that unless a large group, such as a social 
movement, offers selective incentives to its members and potential members, 
individuals acting rationally will refrain from making contributions for the benefit of 
the whole group, because each person will prefer to wait until someone else 
works to secure a collective good. Therefore, according to Olson, the only way to 
overcome the dilemma of collective action in large groups is through selective 
incentives.  
 Debra Friedman and Doug McAdam, in their work on the importance of 
interactions among individuals and the collective identity that arises from those 
interactions, argue that the strongest selective incentives of social movements 
are collective identities and affiliation (164). The authors define collective identity 
(of a social movement) as “a shorthand designation announcing a status—a set 
of attitudes, commitments, and rules for behavior—that those who assume the 
identity can be expected to subscribe to.” In addition to advertising a person’s 
status, however, collective identity conveys an individual’s desire to be part of a 
group and to forge a shared identity with that group  (157). 
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 Furthermore, the authors point out a flaw in the rational choice component 
of the collective action dilemma: the theory does not account for relationships 
among individuals. For example, rational choice theorists see the individual as 
being isolated when running cost-benefit analyses; however, it is the connections 
that exist between that individual and others (such as friends, family, co-workers, 
and colleagues) that determine the likelihood of individuals to participate in 
collective action (158). While not all actors who happen to be embedded in a 
network will be sufficiently persuaded to join a social movement, it is indeed the 
network that acts as a catalyst for the mobilization of those who do eventually 
join; the nature, identity, or ideology of any particular network (which, it is 
important to keep in mind, exists prior to, and is usually a cause of  the 
emergence of a social movement) is typically the deciding factor in regards to 
which ‘side’ an individual decides to support.  
 Friedman and McAdam identify three developmental stages of a social 
movement to illustrate the dependence of new social movements on the 
networks and organizations that they emerge out of (162). The first stage sees 
this emergence itself. Selective incentives do not have to be employed in this 
stage of the process, because the movement is already supported by the 
appropriate individuals within an existing network. In addition, a collective identity 
already exists that binds members of the new movement together. In the second 
stage, however, the full realization and consolidation of a movement requires a 
committed and identifiable organization which is separate from that of the 
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network which bore it. Here, the need for incentives to attract new members and 
retain old ones becomes apparent. The new social movement organization (now 
formal and independent) must forge a new collective identity, which, according to 
Friedman and McAdam, this identity serves as the most important selective 
incentive, whose function is to promote activism. The creation of a new collective 
identity is necessary to maintain and increase levels of participation, because 
“uncoupling the movement from established organizations means that organizers 
can no longer rely upon the incentive structure of those groups to motivate 
participation” (163). Finally, in stage three, the solidarity incentive of collective 
identity is transformed into a public good and is therefore subject to the free-rider 
problem. Groups then must strike a balance between the desire to be influential 
(to affect policy) and the need to keep membership exclusive enough so that the 
incentive (collective identity) remains selective. 
 In The Social Construction of Protest and Multiorganizational Fields, Bert 
Klandermans focuses on the idea of collective consciousness as it applies to 
social movements and protests. He tries to identify a stage that he believes is the 
crucial starting point of collective action: a “significant transformation in the 
collective consciousness of the actors involved” (78). This transformation 
consists of the process whereby participants in a movement “define their 
situation” and “convince people that movement participation is effective” (77), 
and that these are processes “of signifying, interpreting, and constructing 
meaning” (78). In other words, “individuals behave according to a perceived 
8 
 
 
 
reality” (77). The task then, according to the author, is to figure out how such 
transformations occur.  
            Klandermans argues that collective beliefs are shared by people and 
proliferate through networks and groups, and that the transformation of such 
beliefs is the driving force behind collective action. In particular, Klandermans 
points to the potential for success expectations to spark such a transformation 
(85-6). 
 The actual success of any protest movement, according to Klandermans, 
is heavily dependent on a certain type of collective belief: the degree to which the 
public expects the protest movement to be a success. There are three types of 
‘success expectations’: the effectiveness of collective action, the effectiveness of 
the individual’s contribution, and the behavior of other individuals. Here, the 
importance of networks and groups is evident: each of the three types of success 
expectations is affected by the relationships and communication among 
individuals. 
 “The greater the number of individuals who believe that collective action 
will be successful, the more likely it is that mass action will materialize and that 
authorities will respond” (86). According to the logic of collective action as 
discussed above, we can understand these beliefs as part of the incentives 
component. In such a case, an individual’s belief that he or she will make a 
difference (i.e., will make success more likely) serves as a (non-selective) 
incentive to get involved. 
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CHAPTER 3. HISTORY OF THE CONFLICT 
 
 The Israel/Palestine conflict is one of the most highly charged issues in 
global politics today. It has been ongoing since the late 1800s, when the Zionist 
movement emerged among the Jewish people in the Diaspora (the ‘scattering’ of 
Jews outside of the land of Israel since Roman times, when they were driven 
out). Zionism is defined as a belief among Jews that they should return to the 
lands of Zion, from which they were driven by the Romans nearly one thousand 
years ago; Zion refers to the geographic area of the Holy Land in the Middle 
East, especially Jerusalem (Caplan 4, 18). Even more than simply advocating a 
return to Zion, however, the ‘pioneering spirit’ of Zionism called on followers to 
toil and sacrifice through settlement and farming, and stressed military defense 
as a necessary precaution against potential threats to the process (Peled 434). 
The first Jews of the Diaspora began to settle in Palestine according to the vision 
of the Zionist movement, eager to realize the dream of returning to their 
homeland. Jewish immigration occurred in several waves prompted by events in 
their home countries such as the Holocaust and the dissolution of the Soviet 
Union. These waves of Jewish immigration into Arab-inhabited lands caused 
much conflict, as followers of Zionism clashed with the local population.  
 The status of the indigenous Arabs in the lands of Palestine before the 
creation of the State of Israel is a point of contention in the conflict. Since the 
area went from Ottoman control to a Mandate under the British, many have 
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argued that the Palestinians never had a national claim to the land and that there 
is no such thing as a Palestinian. Under Ottoman control, the area was simply 
part of the Arab world and was not a separate entity. When the British took over, 
they engaged in a series of agreements with both the Jews and the indigenous 
Arabs, in which support for a future nation for each group was given, leading to 
such designations as the “much too promised land” (Caplan 57). 
 As the Jewish community in Palestine grew in the decades preceding 
World War I, an increasing sense of nationalism, among both Jewish pioneers 
already in Palestine as well as many  Jews who had not yet joined the 
movement, prompted Zionist leaders to appeal to outside powers in their quest 
for statehood/nationhood. Simultaneously, however, a movement had emerged, 
known as pan-Arabism, among Arabs in the Ottoman empire that envisioned an 
Arab nation. To fulfill this dream, Arab leaders also sought the favor of influential 
external powers. It was the British who were most involved in negotiations with 
Zionists as well as Arab nationalists. These dealings played a major part in the 
forming of the conflict, as the British appeared to have ‘promised’ the lands of 
Palestine to both peoples (Caplan 56-57).  
 In 1915-16 Sir Henry McMahon, the British High Commissioner in Cairo, 
corresponded with the Sharif Hussein of Mecca in an attempt to persuade Arabs 
under Hussein to revolt against the Ottomans. In return, promised McMahon, the 
British would recognize the independence of the Arabs. A short time later, the 
Sykes-Picot agreement designated Palestine as an entity that would be 
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administered internationally rather than being part of a Jewish national homeland 
or an Arab state. This agreement was forged between the British, who after 
World War I would have control of Palestine and Iraq, and the French, who would 
establish a mandate in Lebanon and Syria. Such mandates were imposed by the 
League of Nations at the end of World War I so that the victors of the war may 
control the areas to be mandated in order to prepare them for independence. In 
addition to Palestine, Iraq, Lebanon, and Syria (all from the fallen Ottoman 
Empire), the League created the state of Yugoslavia out of the ruins of the 
Austro-Hungary Empire (Mansbach 124).  
 Finally, in 1917, a document known as the Balfour declaration was 
released by the British government expressing Britain’s decision to support a 
national home for Jews in Palestine (Caplan 56-59). This declaration was the 
product of a friendship between Lord James Balfour, British Foreign Secretary, 
and Dr. Chaim Weizmann, a Zionist leader who later became the first president 
of the State of Israel. Dr. Weizmann had been trying to seek the support of the 
West for a new state for the Jewish people in Palestine; the British, for their part, 
sought the help of the Jews in the fight against the Ottomans (Mansbach 208-
09).  
 By 1947, the British had become quite exasperated at the constant 
barrage of complaints coming from both Jewish immigrants and indigenous 
Arabs. They decided to end the Mandate in Palestine, handing control over to the 
United Nations. This was done because the British no longer wished to expend 
12 
 
 
 
resources controlling an area that was rife with conflict. The UN then devised a 
partition plan for the region, which was to be the blueprint for two separate states 
of Israel and Palestine; however, both sides of the conflict rejected the plan out of 
disagreements over potential borders.  
 A subsequent sharp rise in tensions following the British departure 
resulted in a period of intense fighting during which the state of Israel declared its 
independence. Nearly a million refugees fled the area into the neighboring 
countries of Jordan, Lebanon and Egypt, many of whom remain in camps to this 
day (the United Nations estimates the 2008 refugee population, including 
descendents, to be about 4.62 million). About 160,000 Arabs stayed in the area 
during the fighting; when the war ended in 1949, automatic citizenship to the new 
Jewish state of Israel was granted to about 63,000 of those Arabs who did not 
flee (Peled 435). Those who did not receive automatic citizenship could apply for 
it. The new Arab citizens of Israel were subject to military law and were relegated 
to second-class status, being restricted economically and in movement (Peled 
and Shafir, 402). Immediately after Israel proclaimed its independence, a 
confederation of Arab countries declared war on the new state; armistice 
agreements would later put an end to this fighting (Caplan 1-78). 
 Since this period there have been several conflicts in the region, including 
a dispute over the Suez Canal in 1956, a preemptive attack on Egypt by Israel in 
1967, and a surprise attack mainly by Syria and Egypt on Israel in 1973. In 
addition, there have been two major events known as intifadas, or violent 
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Palestinian uprisings. Conflict has been more or less continuous since the late 
1800s in the region. 
 It is in this context that the Israel/Palestine border dispute began. Conflict 
over borders here is important because it is this issue that drives the continuation 
of hostilities in the region. Failure to agree on borders for a future Palestinian 
state means that the conflict that has been ongoing since the late 1800s will be 
without end. 
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CHAPTER 4. POLITICAL CULTURE AND CONTEXT 
 
 Social movements do not happen in a vacuum, but are influenced by the 
environment in which they take place. The political culture of a country plays an 
important role in the formation and continued existence of a social movement. 
Political culture can also be a determining factor in the success or failure of a 
movement. For example, a society that tends to defer to authority will be less 
likely to view protest movements as legitimate than a society in which dissent is 
encouraged. This section will provide an overview of the Israeli political culture so 
that I may later apply this factor in the analysis of Gush Emunim and Peace Now. 
 In his analysis of the history of the Jewish migration into Palestine in the 
late 19th century, Uri Ben-Eliezer discusses the uniqueness of the institution of 
democracy in Israel and how they have evolved in the collective society. While 
Israeli voter turnout is very high (around 80 percent), voter efficacy is quite low 
(between 25 and 45 percent) (397-98). Voter efficacy refers to the extent to 
which a voter believes he or she can influence policy or the outcome of an 
election (Good and Mayer, 25). Why should this be so? The answer is a 
fascinating example of the kind of path dependency that seems to govern all of 
history and human interaction. The origins of the Israeli collectivist political 
culture can be found in the decades before the 1948 founding of the State: in 
settings such as the kibbutz (collective farms that were modeled after socialist 
and nationalist principles) and the socialist youth movement, as well as the 
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Palmach, the socialist military body that was formed in the early 1940s by native-
born members of the Yishuv (i.e. the children of settlers of Palestine). Because 
immigration into the Palestinian lands was initiated by Russian Jews toward the 
end of the nineteenth century, these future Israelis brought with them their 
socialist-influenced heritage. This, according to Ben-Eliezer, is the key to 
understanding the origins of the collectivist characteristic of modern-day Israeli 
democracy (399-401).  
 A central feature of pre-state Israeli political participation was group 
discussion. These sort of ‘town-hall’ meetings would take place in the familiar 
settings of the kibbutz dining halls or around campfires; such events were viewed 
as necessary to the democratic, if nonliberal1, nature of the Jewish homecoming 
movement. Furthermore, these energetic discussions were of utmost importance 
in an environment of general anxiety and apprehension as to what the future 
might bring. Members of these initial movements were therefore not at all content 
to allow the leadership to monopolize decision-making processes without at least 
lending their voices in critical political participation. 
 The curious nature of such discussions, which would go on to influence 
Israeli political culture for decades, can be attributed to what Ben-Eliezer calls 
‘critical compliance.’ This term combines the verbal component of democratic 
participation, which was a persistent feature of pre-state life, and the strong 
tendency to obey orders and fulfill duties. This ‘outspoken obedience’ became 
                                                          
1
 The use of the terms democratic and nonliberal together refers to the tendency of the pioneers to defer 
to authority and to respect law and order while still exercising their democratic right of verbal dissent. 
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ingrained in society and perpetuated through social norms, which persisted until 
and beyond the establishment of the State, and into contemporary Israel. 
Interestingly, the roots of this sort of political attitude can be found in the 
realization by the leadership that the public is much more easily controlled if it 
feels it has a say in matters of importance (402-04).  
 This perception of a ‘collective will’ has survived intact, and is used by 
Ben-Eliezer to explain the differences between Gush Emunim and Peace Now. 
Newman and Hermann (1992) describe Gush Emunim as being more legitimate 
in the eyes of the public and as having enjoyed more public support than Peace 
Now (524-25). Ben-Eliezer’s explanation of the relative success of Gush Emunim 
can be understood in terms of the social norms of collectivism that first 
manifested themselves in pre-state times. The balance that Gush Emunim has 
struck between collaborating with the government, on one hand, and outwardly 
criticizing it, on the other, has contributed greatly to the movement’s success. 
This is because it was able to use the government to its advantage when 
necessary, such as by gaining the support of influential members and by 
securing funds for building settlements. On the other hand, when Gush Emunim 
felt that the government did not go far enough in helping the group to realize its 
goals, the group had no qualms about engaging in illegal activities and directly 
challenging the government’s policies. Conversely, Peace Now seems to lack a 
coherent set of principles that is reflected in the ambivalence of its members to 
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military service and the group’s unwillingness to challenge the authorities and the 
law, as Gush Emunim has (407).  
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CHAPTER 5. GUSH EMUNIM AND PEACE NOW 
 
 The characteristics of Israel are unique: it is a democracy in the Middle 
East, it is a relatively new state, it faces extraordinary security problems, and it is 
quite factionalized as far as the political culture goes; and yet, there is a great 
deal of social solidarity and collective identity. The diversity of Israeli ideology is 
reflected in the different social movements that have cropped up in the past few 
decades, and one of the most salient issues in Israeli ‘intermestic’ (international 
and domestic combined) politics has to do with the results of the 1967 Six-Day 
War. During this war Israel annexed the territories of Gaza and the West Bank, 
as well as Syria’s Golan Heights and Arab East Jerusalem. The Egyptian Sinai 
was also annexed but was returned in 1979 after Egyptian president Anwar 
Sadat offered a peace treaty in exchange. The political talks accompanying this 
‘peace’ offering were in danger of failing; Peace Now was formed in 1978 when a 
few hundred officers and reservists of the Israeli Army sent a letter to Prime 
Minister Menachem Begin asking for his consideration of returning all of the 
annexed lands to the Arabs. Five years earlier, in 1973, Egypt and Syria had 
launched a surprise attack on Israel; the resulting sense of vulnerability in Israel 
had given rise to Gush Emunim and its mission of settling the territories captured 
in 1967. The issue of the occupied territories continues to divide Israel between 
the ‘peace camp’ and the settlers, while at the same time Israelis are united 
against a common threat. The dynamics of the Israeli democracy and its 
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involvement in the war zone of the Middle East makes any inquiry into 
sociopolitical processes an interesting and important one. 
 
GUSH EMUNIM 
 The early days of Israeli statehood saw a growing tension between those 
who adhered to the nationalist-religious vision of Zionism and those who sought 
to build Israeli society on secular principles. Young Zionists began to coalesce 
into a distinct group that would rise up in opposition to such secularism and 
which would challenge the government and its policies. This group of individuals 
was highly cohesive, as members of this group had spent significant amounts of 
time together throughout school, in religious associations, and in military service 
after graduation (Peleg 52-54).  
 The catalyst that prompted these individuals to formally establish Gush 
Emunim (Bloc of the Faithful) was the upheaval of the 1967 Six Day War and the 
subsequent 1973 Yom Kippur War. The first of these conflicts saw the 
annexation by Israel of the Gaza Strip and Sinai Peninsula (from Egypt), the 
Golan Heights (from Syria), as well as the West Bank and Arab East Jerusalem 
(from Jordan), all of which were populated by Arabs. These events served to 
compel the founders of Gush Emunim into action in an attempt to revitalize the 
religious spirit of Zionism in the country (Peleg 54-55). Another goal of the group 
was to prevent another instance of the events of 1973, when Egypt and her Arab 
allies launched a surprise attack on Israel on the Jewish holiday of Yom Kippur; 
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the group believed that God had punished the people of Israel with the attack 
because they were not moving fast enough toward redemption (Peleg 56 n6).  
 The dominant view in Israel in the years following the 1967 war was that 
the annexed territories were now rightfully owned by Israel and that they should 
be settled by Jews, either as a security precaution or, as argued by Gush 
Emunim, as a duty called for in Jewish prophecy (Efrat 35). Thus the context of 
the emergence of this movement was one of geopolitical upheaval at a time 
when the internal political environment of Israel was fostering the rise of 
nationalist/religious sentiments. The “low morale in the Jewish population” (Efrat 
36) that resulted from the events of 1973, helped propel this shift toward a more 
conservative political environment, culminating in the election of the right-wing 
Likud party in 1977 in place of the long-dominant and left-leaning Labour party.  
 One party, the National Religious Party (NRP), had some influence in the 
Knesset despite its small size. The NRP had advocated the same goals as Gush 
Emunim; it was thus the logical choice for Gush Emunim to affiliate with the NRP 
in order to enjoy some access to decision making and the political process. At 
times, however, Gush Emunim distanced itself from the party when the NRP’s 
position on various policies seemed too generous toward the Arabs (Peleg 79). 
 At this time, Israel was experiencing a growth in political activity that 
occurred outside the decision-making arena. This ‘extra-parliamentarism’ 
appears to have been the result of decreasing faith in the government, which in 
turn came about with the jarring assault of the 1973 Yom Kippur War. This gave 
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rise to groups like Gush Emunim: as support for the establishment significantly 
waned in the 1970s, non-partisan forces gained legitimacy and the power to 
sway and manipulate government policymaking (Newman and Hermann 510).  
 In his article detailing the history of Gush Emunim, Eliezer Don-Yehiya 
offers a review of a collection of articles about the movement. He explores the 
movement’s ideological origins, which can be found in the teachings of Rabbi Zvi 
Yehuda Kook, the son of the famous Rabbi Avraham Yitzhak Hakohen Kook 
(better known as simply Rav Kook). Rabbi Yehuda Kook is credited with 
transforming the group from its informal status into a politically powerful entity in 
1974 (Foundation for Middle East Peace). Don-Yehiya argues that while the 
elder Kook conceived of ‘holiness’ as something that was inherent in the Jewish 
people and which could be realized through abiding by the principles laid out by 
the Torah, the younger Kook believed that a sovereign Jewish state in the Holy 
Land was the manifestation of the holiness of the Jewish people and is ordained 
by God: 
 
Rav Zvi Yehuda’s conception of holiness is reflected in the strong emphasis 
which he places on the territorial-political dimension of Jewish redemption. In 
Rav Zvi Yehuda’s view the sacred nature of the Land of Israel obliges Jews to 
fulfill the ‘commandment of conquest’ by settling the whole land and defending 
Jewish sovereignty over it. Since the fulfillment of that commandment is 
considered a significant part of the redemption process, any territorial 
compromise is conceived as a serious interruption in this God-ordained 
messianic process, and hence should be resisted by every available means 
with no regard for the attitudes and reactions of other nations (226). 
 
His teachings thus inspired Gush Emunim to continue in the struggle for the 
establishment of the Jews throughout the entire ‘Promised Land,’ which, 
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according to religious texts, includes the territory extending to the Euphrates 
River and encompasses parts of Egypt, Lebanon, Syria, Jordan, Iraq, and 
possibly Turkey and Saudi Arabia. Gush Emunim’s focus on territorial acquisition 
prompted the group to attribute the results of the Six-Day War (Israel’s 
annexation of territories) to nothing less than an act of God (228).   
 Religion and messianic tradition is a powerful motivator for the group’s 
support of expansionism; members and supporters, especially settlers 
themselves, tend to view events through the lens of prophecy. For example, the 
ability of the Jewish people to survive such a catastrophic experience as the 
Holocaust is seen by Gush Emunim as evidence of the ‘chosen’ status of Jewry, 
and the 1967 Six-Day War is believed to be a direct and forceful message from 
God regarding the true ownership and entitlement of the land of Israel. The 
ideologies and beliefs of the settlers are rooted in the Biblical ideal of the 
Promised Land, and an intense conviction that the settlers are carrying out God’s 
will has been a driving force behind Gush Emunim’s fearlessness and willingness 
to clash publicly with the law (Newman and Hermann 514). 
 The leadership of Gush Emunim has mostly consisted of middle-class 
Ashkenazi (those with European ethnic origins) Jews who tend to be highly 
educated; the leaders of the movement were mostly original founders (Newman 
and Hermann 516-517). These Ashkenazi tended to be young; according to 
Kimmerling, the movement was a sort of backlash by the youth against the older 
generation. These youth tended to be nationalistic and religious and perceived 
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the older generation as having turned away from religion and nationalism in favor 
of secularism and socialistic principles of Zionism (169). In addition, the leaders 
were charismatic and were thus very effective in gaining followers who were 
drawn to the prophetic messages and goals of the group. The followers in turn 
were instilled with a high degree of enthusiasm and a sense that their actions 
and deeds were meaningful and were approved of by God (Peleg 64). One 
strategy of Gush Emunim was to remain somewhat secretive and mysterious. 
The group acknowledged no official membership and took care to conceal its true 
size and reach from the general public. This was done in part to strengthen the 
message of the group and to maintain a religious as opposed to a political quality 
(Peleg 80).  
 Since Gush Emunim was a movement concerned with settling the lands of 
the disputed territories, an undertaking that followers believed to be ordained by 
God, the main strategy of the group was to facilitate the building of settlements at 
all costs, even when illegal. The strategic outcome of doing this was that once a 
settlement was established, it became very difficult if not impossible to reverse 
the action. The means by which Gush Emunim disseminated its message 
included using the established settlers as a tangible example of what the group 
can offer supporters; Gush Emunim settlements were often showcased during 
mass rallies at these locations. The first Gush Emunim settlement, called Kiryat 
Arba, was established in 1968 east of the city of Hebron. Thirteen more were 
created by the end of the year in the areas of the Golan Heights, the West Bank, 
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and the northern Sinai Peninsula. By 1973, settler population in these territories 
numbered about 1,500. As of 2005 there were about 460,000 Jewish settlers in 
the disputed areas of the West Bank, East Jerusalem, and the Golan Heights. 
About 8,000 settlers had lived in the Gaza Strip until 2005, when they were 
evacuated by the Israeli government because of difficulties with the Palestinian 
population. Statistics available on the Foundation for Middle East Peace website 
show a steady increase of settlers in these four areas between 1972 and 2006, 
as shown in Table 1. According to Goldberg, however, the population of actual 
Gush Emunim members amounted to only about 15% of the total Jewish settler 
population as of the late 1980s (196). 
 Another main strategy of Gush Emunim has been to foster strong 
connections with the Israeli government. Its support within and links to right-wing 
governments and political parties in Israel, most notably the Likud party, has 
been a major driving force behind the success of the group. In fact, settlement 
activities that were previously illegal and categorized as approaching terrorism 
were made legal by the Likud-dominated government that began in 1977. 
Settlement projects have also been financed by the government. Between 1968 
and 1976, the Israeli government invested 750 million dollars in settlements in 
the West Bank (about 83.3 million dollars annually). When the Likud took power 
in 1977 the amounts invested in the West Bank averaged 143 million dollars per 
year. In 1984, a new government called the National Unity Government was 
formed with both Likud and Labour parties, and the investment sums dropped to  
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Table 1: Israeli Settler Population 1972-2006 
Year 
West 
Bank 
Gaza 
Strip 
East 
Jerusalem 
Golan 
Heights 
Total 
1972 1,182 700 8,649 77 10,608 
1983 22,800 900 76,095 6,800 106,595 
1985 44,100 1,900 103,900* 8,700 158,700 
1989 69,800 3,000 117,100 10,000 199,900 
1990 78,600 3,300 135,000 10,600 227,500 
1991 90,300 3,800 137,300 11,600 243,000 
1992 101,100 4,300 141,000 12,000 258,400 
1993 111,600 4,800 152,800 12,600 281,800 
1995 133,200 5,300 157,300 13,400 309,200 
1996 142,700 5,600 160,400 13,800 322,500 
1997 154,400 5,700 161,416 14,300 335,816 
1998 163,300 6,100 165,967 14,900 350,267 
1999 177,411 6,337 170,123 15,313 369,184 
2000 192,976 6,678 172,250 15,955 387,859 
2002 214,722 7,277 175,617 16,503 414,119 
2003 224,669 7,556 178,601 16,791 427,617 
2004 234,487 7,826 181,587 17,265 441,828 
2005 258,988 0 184,057 17,793 460,838 
2006 268,400 0 N/A 18,105 N/A 
2007 282,000 0 N/A N/A N/A 
*1986 data 
     Source: Central Bureau of Statistics, Statistical Abstract of Israel, 1992-2006 and List of Localities, the 
Populations, and Symbols, 1995-2005. Statistical Yearbook of Jerusalem, Jerusalem Institute for Israel 
Studies, 1991-2004. Cited by Foundation for Middle East Peace, available from http://www.fmep.org/ 
settlement_info/settlement-info-and-tables/stats-data/israeli-settler-population-1972-2006/. 
 
an average of 125 million dollars per year (Goldberg 195). Newman and 
Hermann argue that Gush Emunim has been used by the Likud government as a 
vehicle for implementation of the types of policies which may be controversial 
and viewed by the international community as undesirable; in this way, the 
government does not have to take responsibility for implementing such policies 
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and can pass the blame onto a group over which it claims it has little or no power 
(525-26). 
 With its emergence in 1968 as an organization that facilitated the 
establishment of Jewish settlements in the territories annexed by Israel in 1967, 
Gush Emunim initially was completely independent of the government, which at 
that time was dominated by the Labour party. The movement was resourceful 
enough to make concrete steps toward fulfilling its vision as a force that would 
populate the occupied lands. The settlement activities in which the group 
engaged were considered illegal under the Labour government; Gush Emunim 
therefore did not derive much power from the state. In 1977, however, with the 
succession of the Likud government, the movement was vastly strengthened with 
the legalization of their settlement activities. It was at this time that it began “a 
process of partial institutionalization and acceptance within government circles” 
(Newman 1). 
 Gush Emunim ceased operating as a national organization in the 1980s 
and transitioned to a regional entity. According to Giora Goldberg, Gush Emunim 
shifted from a social movement in the 1970s to a “regional interest group” in the 
1980s (p. 190), which may explain their dropping out of sight as a formal 
organization. Goldberg argues that, as a social movement in the 1970s the group 
had been mainly ideologically-based rather than policy-based, espousing ideals 
of a Zionist nationalism that needed to be revived to replace the secularism of the 
Israeli government and wider society. Focus was placed on disseminating the 
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religious rhetoric about the inevitability of redemption in the near future and what 
God expected of the Jews at this point in the redemption process. In the 1980s, 
argues Goldberg, the group began be more involved in the practicalities of 
settlement formation and development. While their foundation remained an 
ideological one, they became more policy-oriented as they began to work more 
closely with the government in establishing settlements in the disputed territories 
(190-94). 
 In December of 1987, the Palestinian community in the disputed territories 
staged a violent uprising, the first intifada, against the Israeli occupation. This 
revolt lasted five years and was in large part a struggle between Israeli settlers in 
the West Bank and Palestinians, although it started out as a campaign against 
the Israeli army. Gush Emunim suffered a setback as a result of this event, losing 
some momentum as many secular Israelis, who had been attracted to the 
settlements by economic benefits afforded them by the Israeli government, 
decided not to take the dangerous risks of living in the disputed territories 
(Goldberg 195). 
 In September 1993 a historic peace initiative was under way between the 
Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) and Israeli Prime Minister Yitzhak Rabin. 
The meetings, hosted by US President Bill Clinton, were a tremendous step 
forward for the two groups, which had refused to meet with one another or even 
recognize one another until a preceding meeting in 1991. Issues such as 
Palestinian self-governance were discussed as both parties tried to reach an 
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agreement that would normalize relations and bring the region closer to peace. 
Attempts were also made to allocate the disputed territories to one party or 
another based on population and other factors. Unfortunately, years of Jewish 
settlement in these areas had led to significant changes to demographic realities; 
Arabs and Jews had reached parity in numbers in the disputed territories but the 
Jewish portion was far more developed, organized, and capable. These 
complications helped lead to a breakdown of the Oslo talks as suspicion and 
mistrust abounded, Jewish settlements continued, and terrorism from both sides 
made a vicious comeback (Caplan 202-06). The violence culminated in the 
assassination, by a Jewish extremist with Gush Emunim ties, of Israeli Prime 
Minister Yitzhak Rabin in November 1995.  
 The Gush Emunim community no longer identifies with that name; rather, 
the Israeli public and the media now refer to the group and its sympathizers as 
Ne'emanei Eretz Yisrael, translated as “those who are faithful to the land of 
Israel” (Frey 92). This designation refers broadly to the population of right-wing 
Zionists in Israeli society.  
 
PEACE NOW 
 Peace Now (Shalom Achshav), was founded in 1978 amid fears that a 
chance at peace with Egypt would be a failure. In this year, on March 7, a group 
of 348 military personnel signed a petition which was published in various Israeli 
newspapers, expressing support for a peace treaty. The group’s main objective 
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has been to influence Israeli public opinion on the best way of achieving peace 
and security, which, members believe, can only be achieved by addressing one 
of the most outstanding grievances of the Arabs: the status of the portions of 
Arab-inhabited land, referred to as the ‘disputed territories’, that were taken by 
Israel in the 1967 Six-Day War. Since 1978 Peace Now has been trying to 
pressure the government to give back the occupied territories and return to pre-
1967 borders. Although the group still exists, they have not had success in 
achieving their policy goals. 
 After the release of the “Officer’s Letter” petition, popular support for the 
movement surged. The public, in all sectors of society, appeared to be in favor of 
the messages and goals of the petition (Helman 303). The group also gained 
supporters abroad; in 1981 a sister group, Americans for Peace Now, was 
established in the United States.  
 By the time Israel became involved in Lebanon’s civil war in 1982, the 
group began to experience difficulties. This was apparently due to the fact that 
the soldiers who were peace activists were also participating in the war itself; this 
in turn was due to the strong desire of Peace Now activists to abide by the law 
and defer to authority, which meant military service. This identity crisis resulted in 
“the estrangement of the militant sectors of the constituency” (Helman 304). In 
1982, however, the group saw a spike of public support when about twenty 
percent of the adult population of Israel attended protests held by Peace Now 
which condemned a massacre that had taken place in a refugee camp in 
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Lebanon. The attacks had been carried out by Lebanese Christian militants who 
had been given access to the camp by the Israeli military, which had the camp 
under its control (Kaufman 66). 
 In 1985, Peace Now began an initiative with Palestinians to foster 
connections between the two groups. Special projects were undertaken and 
dialogue was encouraged; the dialogues continued through 1988 when Peace 
Now launched its “Speak Peace with the PLO” campaign, which provided a 
forum in which both sides could voice their frustrations and work together to 
come to a solution. In 1989, two years after the first violent uprising by the 
Palestinians against the Israelis, the group managed to mobilize 25,000 
Palestinian and Israeli individuals who linked hands together in an expression of 
peace during an event called “Hands around Jerusalem” (APN). 
 In 1990, Peace Now began collecting data on the establishment, 
development, and activities of Jewish settlements in the disputed territories. 
Information acquired by the group is reported to newspapers and helps 
contribute to archives maintained by entities such as the Foundation for Middle 
East Peace. Data the group is interested in includes numbers of homes slated for 
construction and the destruction of Palestinian homes to make room for such 
construction. 
 The group was relatively quiet and inactive in the years following the 1993 
Oslo Accords as negotiations faltered and both sides struggled to achieve their 
goals. The post of Prime Minister in Israel changed hands several times over a 
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period of only about six years. The group made a forceful comeback in 2001 
when Ariel Sharon, a provocative former Likud member, was elected Prime 
Minister. Sharon’s hawkish policies were the target of Peace Now’s 
demonstrations and rallies (Kessler 146). Sharon has been accused of provoking 
the second Palestinian intifada (uprising) by visiting a Muslim holy site in 2000. 
However, although Sharon may have helped trigger the outbreak of hostilities, 
his visit was by no means the cause of the violence as there had been many 
factors which led to the second intifada. 
 In 1996, Peace Now organized a trip to the United States for both Israeli 
and Palestinian youth, who traveled to various locations, including high schools 
and the White House, to raise awareness of the issues and to offer possible 
solutions to the conflict. Peace Now lobbied the US government 1997, pushing 
for a responsible US role in the Middle East peace process, and in 1998 
mobilized to encourage a continuation of the Oslo negotiation efforts. The 
Officer’s Letter, first issued in 1978 expressing dismay at the possibility of failed 
peace talks between Israel and Egypt, was reissued in 1998 to mark 20 years of 
Peace Now (APN).  
 As the centerpiece of the general peace movement in Israel, Peace Now 
emerged in the context of a peculiar political culture which emphasized the 
collective good while upholding democracy and the right to voice dissent. The 
ability of Peace Now to materialize in a society facing severe existential threats is 
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a result of a long tradition in Jewish culture that stresses the duty of each 
individual to the overall good of the society (Norell 1-36).  
 In his study of Peace Now, Magnus Norell reconfirms the impact of this 
historic tendency. Reflections of this political culture can be seen in Peace Now’s 
reluctance to partake in illegal activities, even while other peace groups 
espoused more radical forms of protest. Values of obedience to authority are 
apparent, even when that authority is seen as the wrongdoer. Norell argues that 
this attitude contributed to the lack of efficacy of the group (95-100). Kaufman 
points out another reason for the group’s reluctance to break the law; Peace Now 
perceived the illegal activities of Jewish fundamentalist groups as a threat to 
Israeli democracy (68). 
 Peace Now, rather than being a strictly pacifist movement, views the 
attainment of peace largely in functional terms: the only way to ensure the 
security and well-being of the state of Israel is to remove or at least ameliorate 
the sources of Arab and Muslim political grievance. This, of course, entails 
making certain territorial concessions, a move which is highly repugnant to Gush 
Emunim members as well as many Israelis who view such concessions as 
showing weakness and even appeasing terrorists. Although Peace Now does 
stress moralist and universalist values, as well as equal rights for all of humanity, 
its primary concern is a secure future for the Israeli state. The movement’s 
overarching goal is to influence Israeli public opinion of the Palestinian issue, and 
its core message is that a return to the borders that existed before the Six-Day 
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War in 1967, during which Israel annexed Palestinian, Syrian, and Egyptian 
territory as well as East Jerusalem, will to a great extent take the wind out of the 
sails of Middle East terrorism and will have a profound effect on the outlook for 
sustainable peace. National self-determination of the Palestinian people, Peace 
Now argues, is the best (indeed, only) guarantor of the security of Israel.  
 The leadership of Peace Now has been rather weak as a result of the 
group’s operating philosophy. While the movement’s origins consisted of a group 
of a few hundred Israeli military personnel who banded together to petition the 
government on behalf of a smooth peace process with Egypt, as a movement 
Peace Now emphasized a consensus-based decision-making process. While the 
high esteem in which the military has traditionally been held was a boon for the 
movement in the beginning, lending a high degree of legitimacy to its cause, the 
reluctance of the group to engage in ‘majority rule’ in the years following the 
implementation of the peace treaty caused it to suffer from the weaknesses 
inherent in such a decision-making style (Norell 100).  
 In his discussion of the strategies and tactics employed by Peace Now, 
Norell identifies two possibilities that would have confronted the group at the time 
of its emergence. The first of these entailed attaching itself to an established 
political party. This course of action, however, was abandoned; the organization 
believed that identifying itself exclusively with a political party would necessarily 
narrow the pool of potential supporters. Another reason for the group’s 
reluctance to give up its extraparliamentary status was that it was “anti-
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establishment in outlook” and “could draw a lot of support from the prevalent 
feelings of frustration and disappointment with established politics” (Norell 102). 
An alternate, more fitting, strategy was to bring the message directly to the public 
through demonstrations and the like. As Norell points out, however, by taking this 
route Peace Now was confronted by the problem of trying to mobilize followers 
and dispel its message within the confines of the law. Nevertheless, the group 
stayed true to its main objective of appealing to the greatest number of people as 
it possibly could. As Newman and Hermann point out, Peace Now sometimes 
tried to achieve this by trying to direct attention away from its “Ashkenazi stigma” 
of elitism, extending its reach into issue areas such as poverty and 
homelessness (516). This diversification was also an attempt to persuade the 
populations of these traditionally Likud-backing neighborhoods to withdraw their 
support from the right-wing government by advising them that funding for public 
programs was threatened by the cost of developing and maintaining settlements 
(Kaufman 68). 
 Peace Now found it difficult to influence policymakers because they did 
not affiliate with a political party. While some lawmakers were public supporters 
of Peace Now, they tended to belong to left-wing fringe groups of the Knesset. 
Affiliating with these lawmakers was seen as potentially damaging to the 
movement’s reputation with the Israeli public. Furthermore, with the Likud 
government’s victory in 1977 over Labour, who had governed for thirty years, 
Peace Now felt it could no longer safely identify with the latter due to the public’s 
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rejection of it. Nor could they hope to accomplish anything with the right-wing 
Likud, as the new government’s platform was partially built upon the idea that the 
disputed territories taken in the 1967 war belonged to Israel (Norell 100-102). 
Peace Now has thus enjoyed only limited government access and very little, if 
not zero, of the public funds that have been made available to its rival group, 
Gush Emunim (Newman and Hermann 522).  
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CHAPTER 6. HOW SUCCESS IS DEFINED 
 
 This study attempts to answer the question of why Gush Emunim was so 
successful relative to its political adversary Peace Now. The success of a social 
movement should be defined in terms of achievement of objectives; in these two 
cases, this means the attainment of policy goals. Success can also be measured 
in terms of the extent of mobilization and the lack of ‘free riding’.  
 The policy goals of Gush Emunim centered on the ability to carry out 
settlement activity in the occupied territories without interference from the 
government. In achieving this goal they saw a great success in 1977, when the 
new right-wing Likud government legalized settlement activity which had been 
illegal under the previous Labour government. According to the Foundation for 
Middle East Peace, as of 2005 there were about 460,000 Jewish settlers in the 
disputed areas of the West Bank, East Jerusalem, and the Golan Heights. About 
8,000 settlers had lived in the Gaza Strip until 2005, when they were evacuated 
by the Israeli government because of difficulties with the Palestinian population. 
Statistics available on the Foundation for Middle East Peace website show a 
steady increase of settlers in these four areas between 1972 and 2006. 
 Peace Now’s main goal is very clear: the State of Israel must withdraw 
from the territories captured in the 1967 Six Day War. This, the group argues, is 
the only way for Israel to survive and enjoy a peaceful existence. The group 
specifies a number of policy goals that would bring this main objective closer to 
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reality. According to their web site, Peace Now desires a two-state solution to the 
conflict that have a foundation in the borders that existed in June of 1967 but that 
cannot be exactly modeled today due to Israeli settlement activity. In addition, the 
city of Jerusalem would be shared in such a way that it would be an 
administrative capital for both Israel and a Palestinian state. Furthermore, a 
relationship between Israel and Syria should be forged in order to ensure peace 
for both Arabs and Israelis (Peace Now). 
 Differences in mobilization between Gush Emunim and Peace Now can 
also be used to measure success. Gush Emunim has been able to appeal to 
many different groups in Israeli society whose views are congruent with Gush 
Emunim’s goals, whether for religious, political, or personal reasons. While the 
movement itself is based on religion, many participants in the settlements are 
doing so for political or even racist reasons rather than for religious redemption 
purposes. Gush Emunim did not suffer from free riding because they offered a 
selective incentive that was directly tied to their goals: by enabling settlers to 
build homes (the selective incentive) in the disputed territories, the group was 
able to preclude the possibility of Israel ever giving these areas back to the Arab 
countries from which they came. Any territorial concessions made by the 
government of Israel would necessarily mean that any settlements in those lands 
would be dismantled, a process that would affect hundreds of thousands of 
Israelis and would therefore be politically impossible.  
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 In contrast, Peace Now has had intermittent support in the form of 
demonstrations that are themselves in reaction to government policies rather 
than ongoing activities. As mentioned above, the group was able to mobilize 
400,000 supporters in a demonstration against a particular act of violence in a  
Lebanon refugee camp. This suggests that potential supporters are more likely to 
respond to specific events rather than to continuously expend their energies to 
persuade the government to begin a specific action (Kaufman 76). This tendency 
presents a problem in terms of lack of sufficient support and mobilization of 
resources. In addition, Peace Now suffers from free riding because they offer no 
selective incentives other than identity and affiliation, which is easy to gain 
without contributing any resources. One may simply sign up to be on the group’s 
mailing list to receive updates on settlement activity, but the incentive to donate 
money or participate in rallies is weak.   
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CHAPTER 7. ANALYSIS 
 
 The previously discussed literature on social movement theory and 
collective action can help us form an understanding of the relationship between 
Gush Emunim and Peace Now, the relationship of each to the Israeli government 
and public, and the relative effectiveness of each in achieving their goals and 
influencing public opinion. I identify four factors related to social movements that 
are central to answering the question of why Gush Emunim has been more 
successful than Peace Now. These are: selective incentives as elaborated by 
Olson; the collective identity as the most important of these selective incentives 
as argued by Friedman and McAdam; the expectation of success as a collective 
belief, as discussed by Klandermanns, and finally, the unique political culture and 
historical experience of Israel. 
 The logic of collective action as discussed by Olson is based on rational 
choice theory. This stipulates that individuals are rational actors and that they will 
compare the costs of contributing their effort to attain a collective good with the 
benefits of enjoying that collective good once it is attained. However, argues 
Olson, since a public good is applicable to all members of a group or a 
population, each individual will rationally choose to let someone else exert 
energy and spend time working for the public good. Therefore, no public good 
will be achieved, unless of course selective incentives exist to motivate 
individuals to participate. 
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 In applying this logic to Gush Emunim and Peace Now, it is helpful to 
begin by assessing what types of collective goods are at stake. Since collective 
goods are those goods that apply equally to everyone, they are often non-
excludable. Clean air and water, a security-providing military, and public 
transportation infrastructure are all examples of such public goods. Whether or 
not an individual participates in cleaning up the environment, he will enjoy the 
benefits of clean air and water; this is the essence of the free-rider problem of 
collective action.  
 The public goods that will come about if Peace Now is successful are, 
advocates argue, is public security. The primary argument advanced by Peace 
Now is that the state of Israel will be more secure if it makes the proper territorial 
concessions to the Palestinians (namely, those territories seized by Israel during 
the 1967 Six-Day War) and agrees to a two-state solution. Therefore, peace and 
security are the collective goods that will be achieved if Peace Now reaches its 
goals.  
 The collective good envisioned by Gush Emunim is also one of security, 
as with Peace Now, as well as religious fulfillment. While stressing the extreme 
importance of the continued survival of the state of Israel, they believe that by 
carrying out their settlement activities they are ‘helping along’ the redemption 
process, which will ultimately result in the complete fulfillment of religious 
prophecies (Don-Yehiya, 226). However, although this goal is abstract in nature 
and would be a collective good for all Jewish people (according to the 
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movement), it is not a goal that is interpreted in the same way by everyone. Even 
among supporters of Gush Emunim, for example, there are divergent views. 
Some believe that settlements truly are a God-ordained duty; others are along for 
the ride for political reasons; still others may be highly religious but believe God 
will punish those who ruthlessly attempt to establish sovereignty over Eretz 
Yisrael (the Biblical Land of Israel). Furthermore, there are many Israelis who do 
not support the movement, for whom the expansionist goal of Gush Emunim 
would not be a collective good at all. This is in contrast to the ideas of security 
and survival through peaceful means, which would benefit all Israelis (except for, 
perhaps, ‘irrational’ ones, who enjoy war for war’s sake). 
 The selective incentive offered by Gush Emunim is that of a home for 
oneself and one’s family in the context of fulfilling God’s prophecy. Peace Now, 
on the other hand, have not offered any comparably concrete selective 
incentives. The only incentive offered to participants is that of affiliation, which 
will be elaborated upon with the application of the social movement theories of 
Friedman and McAdam (below).  
 Peace Now has not offered selective incentives beyond identification with 
the ‘peace movement,’ and Gush Emunim has been much better at mobilizing its 
members and recruiting new participants as a result of the selective incentive of 
a home and a place in the redemption process. Another reason for the difference 
in mobilization and the gathering of support is that the goals of Peace Now seem 
to be quite out of reach and perhaps unattainable. There have been no real gains 
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brought about by Peace Now’s activities since its inception in 1978. Supporters 
believe in a highly desirable end, but have no real, concrete way of getting there. 
Conversely, Gush Emunim has not experienced the kind of collective action 
problems as its counterpart, largely because it has inched toward its ultimate 
goal incrementally and in very concrete ways. Indeed, these incremental 
advances may be viewed by some or many participants to be ends in 
themselves. 
 To elaborate on Gush Emunim’s mobilizing successes, it is the 
establishment of settlements in Palestinian land (albeit annexed land), and the 
potential for more settlements, that is a highly motivating factor for supporters 
and participants of Gush Emunim. The steady expansion of the Jewish people 
into the Biblical Eretz Yisrael represents the continual realization of the 
movement’s goal. In contrast, the faraway objective of Peace Now bears more 
resemblance to the finish line of a very long racetrack or obstacle course that 
must be crossed in order for success to occur.  
 These differences illustrate the degree to which the nature of the sought-
after collective good can motivate individuals to participate in a social movement. 
For Peace Now, mobilization is difficult because people do not believe anything 
they do will make a difference. In this, potential supporters who are ideologically 
predisposed to support a peace movement will refrain from exerting themselves 
because they do not anticipate any benefits to reward the costs they incur in 
participating. Gush Emunim, on the other hand, does not face as acute a 
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dilemma of collective action because the gains to be had from participating in the 
movement are of extreme value; in addition, they are likely to be achieved 
through a little bit of hard work. Actual and potential participants are constantly 
exposed to the successes of other settlers, and therefore calculate that their own 
reward will be quite high relative to their effort. 
  The insight of Friedman and McAdam on the problem of collective action 
can provide us with another perspective of Peace Now and Gush Emunim. The 
authors argue that social movements progress through three stages of 
development, with the first stage being the emergence of the movement from an 
existing network, organization, or social group. This, according to the authors, is 
a crucial indicator of the future success of a movement; it is at this stage that the 
pre-existing collective identity is conferred upon the new movement, and by 
virtue of a pre-formed identity, the free-riding problem does not occur because 
members are already participants (162). Gush Emunim emerged in the aftermath 
of the 1967 Six-Day War from the National Religious Party (NRP), whose identity 
of being ‘faithful to the land of Israel,’ according to the translation for the Hebrew 
name they were given by the Israeli media, was directly transferred to the new 
‘Bloc of the Faithful.’ It was after the 1973 Yom Kippur war (a surprise attack on 
Israel by the Arab countries) that this organization became independent from its 
‘parent’ network (the NRP), thereby entering stage two of the process outlined by 
Friedman and McAdam.  
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 In contrast, Peace Now did not arise in such a manner. Although the initial 
organizers of the movement shared an identity with one another by being 
soldiers in the Israeli army, the movement was formed on an ad-hoc basis when 
the 1978 Israeli-Egyptian peace talks were in danger of failing. These soldiers 
and reserve officers were soon joined by members of the public, who offered 
their support for the initiative of the soldiers. This initiative took the form of a letter 
sent to the Israeli Prime Minister expressing the desire of Israelis to live in peace. 
Their request, however, involved the withdrawal of Israel from the occupied 
territories which were seized during the Six-Day War in 1967 (Peace Now), a 
highly questionable and quite repugnant idea that was seen by a great many as 
being the most dangerous of alternatives. It appears, then, that the movement 
did not undergo the critical stage one of the process, and instead materialized in 
stage two. The lack of a parent network and being formed in such an ad-hoc 
manner meant that Peace Now did not have a stable and meaningful collective 
identity with which to start. On the one hand, while the majority of Israeli citizens 
may have wished for peace, only a small minority was willing to make the 
concessions stipulated in the letter to the Prime Minister. Peace Now could 
certainly not count on the support of the rest of the society with such a goal. On 
the other hand, before the peace talks of 1978, the identity shared by soldiers 
and reserve officers was a military one. They identified with one another by being 
in the army and because they happened to regard a specific course of action as 
being the best method of obtaining peace, not by being peace activists.  
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 Stage three, the period of tension and decline of a social movement, was 
curiously never reached by Peace Now, however. At this stage in the evolution of 
a social movement, the collective identity begins to be assumed by more and 
more people in a society, regardless of whether they contribute their resources to 
the group; this tendency is known as free-riding. As previously stated, the 
significant majority of the Israeli public was not and is not sympathetic to the 
stated goals of Peace Now. Without a large enough group of followers (i.e., a 
‘critical mass’), the movement has not seen such problems of free-riding. Peace 
Now can be regarded as a movement with a collective good (peace and security) 
as the ultimate goal but can offer no selective incentives of any value for 
nonmembers. As mentioned above, in contrast, Gush Emunim is a group that 
offers valuable selective incentives (settlements) that appeal to large segments 
of the Israeli population. Gush Emunim overcame the traditional free-rider 
problem with the selective incentive they offered. It also paired this with another 
goal of the organization, religious support from the sector of the population that 
believes redemption will result from settlement of the occupied territories. Thus, 
the magnitude of Gush Emunim participation has surpassed the critical mass. 
 As previously mentioned, Klandermans discusses the dissemination by 
the media of certain ‘ideological packages,’ which then play a significant role in 
shaping the issues and attitudes that are salient at any point in time in a society 
(79). For Israel, the most outstanding issue has always been one of security. 
Since the state’s founding in 1948, the very existence of Israel has been 
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threatened by outside forces, and every single Israeli citizen who consumes 
media has been, and will continue to be, reminded of it every day.   
 The high salience of Israel’s security issue has been taken advantage of 
by Gush Emunim, who then uses it as a tool to delegitimize its opponent, Peace 
Now. By portraying Peace Now as a group whose objectives are careless and 
not in tune with the realities faced by Israelis, Gush Emunim contributed to 
preventing its opponent from gaining support. The collective identity of Jews as 
being a persecuted people who must preserve the security of their country at all 
costs has not been kind to the proposition that by withdrawing from the occupied 
territories, the most pressing of the external threats will vanish. While such a 
strategy could in reality turn out to be the best way of achieving peace, it certainly 
does not guarantee the disappearance of these dangers. For many Israelis, this 
is too great of a risk to take, considering that the failure of such a strategy could 
be catastrophic and would undoubtedly leave the country in even more danger.  
 It is this collective identity and political culture that can be seen as the 
binding force behind the general distaste for Peace Now and the recognition of 
Gush Emunim. According to Friedman and McAdam, a necessary condition that 
must be met before an individual associates himself or herself with a social or 
political group is that the identity of the group in question must be at least 
somewhat similar to the identity that an individual attaches to himself. In other 
words, “people affiliate with groups for a variety of reasons, but they are not 
about to do so if the group’s identity is incompatible with their image of 
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themselves” (164). Uri Ben-Eliezer’s analysis of the collectivist nature of the 
democratic political culture in Israel supports this idea and helps to explain the 
relative success of Gush Emunim: “Espousing a collectivistic ethos, neither Labor 
[the left-wing government] nor its successor, the Likud [the right-wing 
government], could put up a firm resistance to Gush Emunim’s settlement 
activities, which were portrayed as part of the past and present ‘collective will’” 
(407). 
 In order to compare Gush Emunim and Peace Now, David Newman and 
Tamar Hermann trace the activities and impact of these two groups since their 
founding in the 1970s. It has been demonstrated in various studies and accounts 
that Peace Now has historically been less effective at achieving its goals than 
Gush Emunim; Newman and Hermann provide an excellent and informative 
comparison of the two in order to illustrate the reasons why this is so. One of the 
primary points of the authors’ argument is that it is the relationship between a 
protest movement and the government, on the one hand, and the degree to 
which the public views the movement as legitimate, on the other, that determines 
the success or failure of any given protest movement in Israel (524). Similarly, 
Tamar Hermann notes in a separate work that the ability to influence the 
government while still conforming to sociopolitical norms is a mixture that is 
significantly advantageous to the success of a protest movement (160). 
 The uniqueness of the historical experience and the culture that grew out 
of that shared experience makes Israel an interesting case to study from any 
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perspective. The Jewish collective memory of mass persecution has contributed 
in a substantial way to the political culture of Israel, and the security-oriented 
attitude among Israelis that has necessarily been instilled due to an environment 
of constant external threat has given rise to a general legitimacy problem for 
groups that appear to trivialize these security issues. According to Newman and 
Hermann, it is this rather unreceptive political atmosphere that has plagued the 
Peace Now movement since its inception. 
 Edy Kaufman has identified four factors that have undoubtedly contributed 
to the inability of Peace Now to influence government policy: First, the peace 
movement, while espousing its share of militancy, is not nearly as aggressive as 
the settlement movement. This has resulted in a failure of members to sufficiently 
commit to its cause, preferring to continue to lead normal and busy lives which 
do not leave much room for continual activism. Second, Peace Now activists 
have been branded traitors and have even been accused of spying for the 
Palestinian Liberation Organization. The tendency for society to label the group 
as such has caused major legitimacy issues. Third, rather than taking initiative, 
Peace Now tends to react to events and decisions made by government 
personnel. This includes occasional demonstrations when events occur or major 
government decisions are made, rather than continuous activism. Fourth, the 
occupation has taken on a characteristic of irreversibility as more and more 
settlements are erected. It is widely believed that settlement activity in the 
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occupied territories represent a fait accompli that cannot be undone without 
major difficulties and political unrest (Kaufman 75-77). 
 The ability of a social movement to operate effectively in this collective 
political culture depends in large part upon the acceptance of its principles by 
society as a whole, as well as the extent to which a group follows the rules of 
society and appears to be looking out for the well-being of all citizens. It is in this 
context that we may gain some insight for Peace Now’s ‘failure’ and Gush 
Emunim’s ‘success.’ Edy Kaufman has an interesting perspective on the 
sociopolitical backdrop against which Peace Now has had to operate: 
 
Certainly, a number of adverse trends have operated autonomously in Israeli 
society and are perhaps too strong to be countered by the forces of the peace 
camp: a powerful coalition of religiously inspired fundamentalists, who call for 
the retention of all the territories promised by God to the people of Israel; a 
belated nationalism which denies the rights of other peoples; a militaristic 
adventurism by those who think the power of arms can impose peaceful 
solutions by creating facts that are irreversible, and racist elements within 
Israeli society that emphasize the superior rights of the Jewish nation. No 
doubt, the minority represented by the peace movement cannot easily 
counteract such powerful trends (69). 
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CHAPTER 8. CONCLUSION 
 
 In applying three theoretical perspectives to two rivaling social protest 
movements in Israel, we have gained much insight into the reasons behind the 
relative success of Gush Emunim as compared with Peace Now. We have seen 
how Olson’s logic of collective action can be invoked to explain the effects of 
incentives (or the lack thereof) on the ability of a movement to mobilize 
participants. The emphasis placed on collective identities and social networks by 
Friedman and McAdam has shed light on how the development processes of 
social movements apply to Gush Emunim and Peace Now. Finally, Klandermans’ 
treatment of ‘success expectations’ has allowed us to see the differences in 
efficacy between the two movements. 
 The fundamental difference in the nature of the goals of these two protest 
movements, is that while Gush Emunim’s objectives are positive, concrete, and 
continuous, the goal of Peace Now bears more resemblance to a far-off and 
unlikely dream that is slipping away with every foot of Jewish expansion into the 
lands of Palestine. Gush Emunim has an advantage in the sense that it is easier 
to take an action than it is to get an entity to undo an action that has already 
been taken (Norell 99; Schelling 69-78). In order to achieve its objectives, Peace 
Now must compel the Israeli government to undo a fait accompli, a task much 
more difficult than that of Gush Emunim. Furthermore, while Gush Emunim 
carries out its tasks by incremental construction of what is more or less 
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permanent (especially since the legalization of settlement activity by the Likud 
government), and therefore enjoys a continuous sense of accomplishment, 
Peace Now conducts its business through petitions and demonstrations, the 
former of which has always been an unpopular political activity in Israel. As 
previously mentioned, the tendency of Israeli society as a whole to view Peace 
Now’s activities as being unpatriotic and even dangerous has contributed to a 
general lack of public and governmental support for the movement. In contrast, 
the use of rallies by Gush Emunim, especially the ones that take place inside 
Palestinian ‘territory’ on Israeli holidays, succeeded in attracting large crowds of 
both supporters and people just looking for a ‘good time.’ The movement has 
been successful in projecting an image of being widely supported, which adds to 
its legitimacy (Newman and Hermann 518). 
 Another reason for the failure of Peace Now to achieve the level of 
success of its counterpart involves ethnic and socioeconomic divisions within the 
left-wing Jewish culture. Specifically, while Peace Now is made up of mainly 
middle-class Ashkenazi Jews (as is Gush Emunim), the propensity of the public 
to view Peace Now as being an elitist group is reflected by the existence of other 
peace groups made up of Sephardic Jews (516). This failure to consolidate 
political influence has not been suffered by Gush Emunim.   
 Organizationally, the centralized decision-making apparatus of Gush 
Emunim has made for a much more efficient movement than the decentralized 
Peace Now. While the latter has often experienced problems of communication 
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and disagreement on direction and programming, Gush Emunim’s strong, 
cohesive, and exclusive leadership has allowed its policies and activities to run 
more smoothly. Furthermore, the low turnover of Gush Emunim’s leadership has 
allowed the group to maintain close governmental ties over time. In contrast, 
Peace Now’s relatively high turnover rate and low lobbying efficacy has 
prevented it from realizing its objectives (Newman and Hermann 517). 
 Another factor that can explain the goal attainment differences between 
Peace Now and Gush Emunim involves the Israeli public and the government. As 
argued by Uri Ben-Eliezer, the political culture of Israel today is a relic of its 
earlier, pre-state society. Ben-Eliezer’s notion of ‘critical compliance’ grew out of 
the relationship between leaders and the public and is still apparent in 
contemporary Israel. Specifically, citizens have always felt intensely compelled to 
question the competency of the leadership and to criticize it when necessary, but 
this attitude was generally coupled with an equally intense desire to obey and to 
carry out duties (402-04). To Ben-Eliezer, then, the institution of democracy in 
Israel is collective rather than liberal in nature.  
 The case of social movements in Israel shows that political culture is an 
important indicator of whether or not a movement will be successful. If the public 
does not embrace a social movement or if the movement does not achieve a 
critical mass of supporters, it will likely fail to reach its goals (as long as its goals 
affect the public at large). To achieve critical mass a social movement must 
overcome the problems inherent in collective action. A group is more likely to 
53 
 
 
 
overcome these problems if it arises out of a previously existing network which 
connects individuals together. As a movement begins to emerge from a network 
its members will collectively assess the likelihood that movement will experience 
success. This expectation of success is an important factor because it 
encourages individuals to commit more time and resources toward making the 
group a success. 
 Further research should be done to assess the effect of collective action 
principles on protest movements. Studying collective action in other regions and 
contexts is important. However, political culture should be taken into account 
when assessing collective action and protest movements, because it shapes the 
way people interact with one another. 
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